This was after my time but I thought it was interesting. Some of you may even have been there.
www.nichecom.com/~vfw/ss/ss3.html

USS Turner Joy (DD-951)

Battle of Brandon Bay
The Last Pitched Surface Gun Battle
12 JAN 73



From: LCDR Jim Chester (USN Retired)
Date: 14 May 1998

The USS Turner Joy (DD-951) was rushed overseas early
in December, 1972 to use its new 5"54cal MK 42 Mod 10
gun mounts that could reliably fire 40 rounds per gun per
minute. With the 3"50cal automatic twin mount rated at 50
rounds per barrel per minute, the Turner Joy could put out
220 rounds per minute. Quite a display of conventional
firepower from a single destroyer. The barrels became so
read hot, that the paint peeled off half the barrel and one
could see the projectiles going through the now transparent
gun barrel. The magazine crews couldn't keep up after three
minutes and the rate of fire slowed to around 30 rounds per
gun per minute for a total of about 150 rounds per minute;
still an awesome display of conventional firepower from a
single destroyer.

Originally assigned to the now "hot" gunline just below the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at the 17th parallel, the ship was
later reassigned to the Surface Striking Force (Commander
Task Unit [CTU] 77.1.1) on about 6 January 1973 to
participate in offensive operations in North Vietnam dubbed
Operation Linebacker II. The ship did maritime interdiction
operations of enemy forces going to South Vietnam from
North Vietnam by day and at night did three waterborne
surface strikes in company with the USS Cochrane
(DDG-21) and USS McCaffery (DD-860). This routine
along with replenishments and a lot of four boiler operation
quickly exceeded the physical and psychological endurance
of the crew. However, the crew was pumped up and
adrenaline kicked in and everybody was on overdrive. The
strike messages came with the latest intelligence on the
enemy gun, missile and air installations. Usually we had
light to moderate enemy shell fire that we were up against
when we attacked inland targets.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF BRANDON
BAY.

The strike message received on the 11th of January was far
different in scope in terms of our offensive effort, not to
mention the defensive effort from the enemy. Intelligence
had us up against at least 40 shore based guns; 130mm
(5.1inch) or larger, North Vietnamese patrol boats,
MIG-19's and MIG-21's and Surface to Air Missile (SAM)
batteries. The battle plan was for TU 77.1.1 to conduct a
coordinated strike with B-52's, numerous fighter-bombers
and Combat Air Patrol (CAP) to attack Troop Staging areas
and Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants (POL) storage sites in the
vicinity of Vihn, North Vietnam about 100 nautical miles
north of the DMZ. The plans called for a large number of
B-52's dropping about 900 tons of bombs, and conducting
a coordinated strike with the 3 destroyers attacking from
seaward at high speed, followed by an attack from
fighter-bombers. After plotting all the data from the strike
message and the latest intelligence message concerning
defensive installations, platforms and sensors, we became
very concerned. We formulated our individual battle plan for
inclusion into the coordinated battle plan. The battle plan
had the 3 destroyers of TU 77.1.1 starting the seaward
surface attack 35,000 yards from the beach at high speed
(over 32 knots) on zigzag courses in a loose line abreast
(approximately 2,000 yards between ships). Each ship
would be on four boiler operation (split plant) with all
systems operational by 2000. All engineering systems,
gunnery systems, electronic systems and fire control
computer systems, including our new Forward Looking
Infrared Radar (FLIR) and new laser beam for instantaneous
range to target that allowed us direct hit capability with the
first round of 5 inch at ranges up to and slightly in excess of
10,000 yards, depending upon atmospheric conditions. The
afloat Commander was embarked in USS Cochrane, which
was the middle ship and the USS McCaffery was to the
north. USS Turner Joy was the southern ship. The threat
axis went from 240 degrees true clockwise to about 050
degrees true once we were inside Brandon Bay. Not a great
proposition. The enemy also had some deadly B240Z
J-band fire control radars that tracked the trajectory of our
shells and through a fire coordination center, returned
deadly accurate counterbattery. In addition, we had to worry
about air threat, so the USS Cochrane was to have their
Standard I SAM battery ready to go and the USS Turner Joy
and USS Cochrane had to be ready to shift to Anti-Air
Warfare (AAW) gunnery on short notice, backed by
shoulder launched Redeye short range SAM's. If enemy
patrol boats were encountered, those would be engaged as
we encountered them.

The battle plan also had the 3 ships firing on our final
approach leg at about 12,000 yards from the beach, prior to
a high speed starboard turn that would put all ships in a
loose line of column. We had our Electronic
Countermeasures (ECM) system (AN/ULQ-6B) and chaff
launching systems (STACK CHAFF) checked out and
ready to go. Every GQ station above the main deck, with the
exception of damage control parties had flak jackets and
steel helmets, plus a number of personnel had side arms
should it come down to that. All missile hazards were
identified and stored or tied down, all radars and other
electronic systems tuned, tweaked and peaked and our
civilian techrep (Hal Settle) that we took into battle with us
peaked and tweaked the FLIR and the laser. In case a ship
was disabled by enemy shell fire, we had our mooring lines
faked on deck for us to go alongside, lash the ships together
and then get underway, all the while under fire. All the
assigned targets had to be fired upon before the request to
engage counterbattery would be approved from the Surface
Strike Commander in USS Cochrane. The plan was briefed
to all concerned and by 1830 or so we were ready to go.

BATTLE OF BRANDON BAY.

The 3 ships formed up in a loose line abreast about 1945, all
at four boiler, split plant operation, running lights off and
about 2030 we went to General Quarters (GQ), (Battle
Stations) and we started our run at 35,000 yards from the
beach building up to 32 knots. Soon we were at 32 knots
and at about 28,000 yards from the beach we started
zigzagging. The zigzag legs were about 3,000 yards long and
all preplanned. TU 77.1.1 started taking counterbattery at
about 28,000 yards from the beach with the USS Cochrane
and USS McCaffery taking the brunt of it. I was plotting the
navigational information and computing the indirect fire
control data for relay to the Firecontrolmen manning the
MK68 fire control computer. At 32-33 knots there is no
room for mistakes. You get it right the first time or not at all.

At 22,000 to 24,000 yards the radar picture cleared
sufficiently for the Combat Information Center (CIC) team
to get accurate fixes and to start the indirect fire control
solution. Ranges came down pretty fast. The information
flow was fast and furious, but pretty smooth. Virtually
everyone was operating at optimum performance, despite
lack of sleep. The bridge forgot to pull in the after lookout
and he was tucked down in the MK 6 Fanfare torpedo decoy
aluminum deck shield with MT 53 going off right over his
head with numerous enemy shells splashing close aboard
and exploding in air bursts around him. He survived the
battle, but I don't think his hearing was ever the same.

About 18,000 to 20,000 yards from the beach, we took a
airburst very close aboard to the starboard CIC watertight
door and we were all stunned. Close call! I immediately
went back to work plotting the mission and checking my
data. OS2 Bob Dunham was on the navigational radar scope
and OS2 Steve Champeau ran the air picture. He kept a very
close eye out for MIG's and did coordination with friendly
aircraft in the vicinity, if needed. OS3 Benoit manned the
surface radar scope, looking for enemy patrol boats. LCDR
"Wild" Bill Hill, our Executive Officer (XO) was the
Evaluator (now called the Tactical Action Officer [TAO])
and made the overall battle decisions in CIC on a command
by negation basis. The Commanding Officer (CDR Bob
Pidgeon), the Weapons Officer (LCDR Mike Austin) were
on the bridge and I believe the Engineering Officer (LT
Holland) was the Officer of the Deck (OOD).

A few minutes after the close aboard airburst, I heard about
15 explosions close aboard in the forward hemisphere of the
ship. All of a sudden my mind drew a blank and heard ENS
Chuck Hall yell at me to get back to work. I know it was
only two or three seconds before I got back to work, but
those were the longest seconds of my life. It has never left
my mind. At about 14,000 yards from the beach, we did the
final check on the indirect fire control solution and found
that we were right on our primary target.

At 12,000 yards from the beach, we turned to our final
approach (zigzag) leg before paralleling the beach and
opened fire with MT 51 at the primary target. After firing
about 15 to 20 rounds, MT 51 had a material casualty and
the Captain and the Weapons Officer sent the great
GMGCM Blaney forward outside the skin of the ship where
shrapnel was now flying all over the place to fix the gun
mount. In a very short amount of time he fixed MT 51 and
we resumed firing. To us in CIC after running 7 miles under
fire, it seemed like an eternity before we resumed fire. We
finished firing the primary target just as we were getting
ready to do a high speed turn to starboard to form a loose
line of column. The high speed turn to starboard wound up
in a loose line of column. By the way, I don't think anybody
had done greater than 30 knots divisional tactics in battle
since WWII.

We used about 15-20 degrees of rudder and heeled quite a
bit. As soon as we steadied, we checked the indirect fire
control solution once more, found that we were on target
and then resumed fire, this time on our secondary target. By
this time we were under extremely heavy fire at point blank
ranges from enemy shore batteries (9,500-10,000 yards)
from the beach. The bridge reported being smothered with
shell splashes and often blinded by the bright orange air
bursts of enemy Able Able Common (AAC) airbursts. I
heard QM3 Ginsburg (now CWO4 Ginsburg, US Coast
Guard) say over the sound powered phones, "Oooui, Eeee,
Aaah, Wow Man" then he announced the ship just took
about 15 airbursts over the forward part of the ship all at
once. Everyone topside could hear the woosh of flying
shrapnel. At this point none of us realistically thought we
would see the morning dawn.......including me. As my Dad
told me there are NO atheists in combat. He was so right!!!
I remember OSSA Larry Bota, an atheist yell out about this
point "God get me out of this". After the battle we reminded
him of what he said. He was shocked and probably changed
forever.

After checking our fire control solution for the third target,
we started firing at our third preplanned target about
9,600-9,800 yards from the beach. Shortly after firing, the
fire control director slewed around the horizon and from CIC
we saw 40+ enemy guns firing at us from the remote
monitor for the FLIR in CIC. As I looked at all the enemy
guns firing at us, I counted as many guns as I could. I recall
counting 44 enemy guns probably 130mm (5.1") or larger.
The recent intelligence, less than 48 hours old was right on
the money. About this time we took another pattern of
shells close aboard and I heard the Electronic Warfare (EW)
Specialists yell out "B240Z...J-band". After a second
pattern of shells landed close aboard, the XO fired off Stack
Chaff pneumatically from the remote controls in CIC. The
enemy B240Z trajectory adjusting radar locked on to the
chaff cloud and the highly accurate counterbattery fell off. If
we had not been going 32+ knots, we would of been hit for
sure. The chaff cloud showed up on the AN/SPS-10 radar
screen with enemy counterbattery shells impacting all
around it.

By this time all ships had fired their tactical targets, all of a
sudden we thought we had sustained a direct hit. The ship
shook violently. After checking all key control stations, we
discovered we had not sustained a direct enemy hit, but it
was the enormous blast overpressure shock wave of the
B-52's hitting with some 900 tons of bombs. They had
dropped all at once and as near as I can remember, we were
11,000 to 12,000 yards from the drop area. The blast
overpressure shook us like we were a kid's rattle being
shaken violently. About this time, the Surface Strike
Commander ordered the high speed retirement of the USS
Cochrane and USS McCaffery. We were ordered to stay
behind with our vastly superior conventional firepower and
cover their retirement. This was turning into a classic
pitched W.W.II style surface gunnery battle for us. Over the
next 10-12 minutes (probably longer), we engaged
numerous counterbattery sites, often shifting to direct fire to
take advantage of the laser beam for instantaneous range of
fire control solution(s). We positively knocked out several
enemy shore batteries to the North and to the West. We
shifted back to indirect fire control and took out three or four
more counterbattery sites. I saw many secondary explosions
at the enemy counterbattery sites from nearby ammo
cooking off.

Somewhere between the direct fire and the indirect fire, the
ship did a high speed 180 degree turn to parallel the beach
(Vihn, NVN) going South. After we steadied up, I looked at
the ship's pit log (speed indicator) and we were doing 33
knots. Incredible! About this time I heard the Captain order
the "TJ" the "hell out of there". I had heard him shouting
this over the 21MC and other key command and control
internal circuits. We did about a 90 degree high speed port
turn to the East. Shortly after steadying up, again
counterbattery became very accurate and was once again
very heavy. Again the EW's announced "B240Z...J-band"
radar and the TJ commenced violent evasive maneuvers to
avoid counterbattery. After another pattern of enemy shells
landed very close aboard, the XO fired another slug of Stack
Chaff and again the enemy counterbattery fell off as the
B240Z radar acquired the chaff cloud (erroneous target).

During this time, upon commencement of our retirement,
we were engaging enemy counterbattery sites with our after
gun mounts (MT 52 and MT 53). Our return fire seemed
uncharacteristically accurate for a destroyer retiring on
violently evasive zigzag courses in excess of 30 knots.
Somewhere during this time frame, I believe we took a hit
very close aboard, which I believe put a hole or a leak into a
freshwater tank, but I am not 100 percent sure. We later lost
a lot of freshwater due to a large leak or hole, so I am
reasonably sure this was the cause.

During our high speed retirement, the throttleman nearly
dragged the boilers and the generators off the line while
firing the after mounts and doing the violent evasive zigzag
maneuvers. The customary whine of the engineering plant
started to wane as the load was beginning to be lost. I
distinctly heard the Captain yell down over the 21MC to
Main Control just two words..."NOT NOW". Right after
that you could hear the whine of the turbines and
generator's come back to their customary pitch. Believe me
when I say that if we had dropped the load that night, we
surely would have been sunk by enemy counterbattery being
directed by those damn B240Z radars.

At about 28,000 yards from the beach, the heavy volume of
enemy counterbattery finally fell off us and in another
minute it was gone. At about 35,000 yards from the beach
we secured from GQ (Battle Stations). I remember that
Chuck Hall and I were so relieved to be alive, that we shook
hands vigorously with huge smiles on our faces. Then I did
the same thing all over again with the XO, Bob Dunham
and Steve Champeau. I then lit up a well deserved cigarette.
To this day it seems miraculous that we survived the
amount of enemy counterbattery that was brought to bear
on our ship. We all lived through this, worked as a well
trained and veteran combat team and we all survived. By the
grace of God we were very lucky.

This was the last fully engaged, totally pitched surface
gunnery battle in U.S. Navy history. We had been
outgunned 5 to 1 in sheer numbers of gun barrels. We had
fought the entire action at speeds over 30 knots, had
inflicted maximum damage on the enemy and emerged
nearly unscathed. The next morning I was out on the
weather decks, looked up and saw part of the AN/SPS-29
radar "bedspring antenna" shot away. However, the 29 radar
performed great despite damage to the antenna and the
waveguides from enemy shell fire. There was also a lot of
shrapnel all over the weather decks. Somewhere around
2130 we started preparing for the night's next two surface
strikes, but none like the Battle of Brandon Bay. Every
surviving crewmember in those ships, especially the USS
Turner Joy remembers the battle of Brandon Bay. It is
forever etched in my memory.

I was assigned to First Division, WESTPAC 72'-73'.

Brandon Bay was really something "one hell of a night"

However, most nights were. I remember getting little to no sleep, replenishment details: ammo, fuel, ship's supplies, mail helicopters. There were two or three replenishments a day, between gunline support missions and Targets North requiring GENERAL QUARTERS.
Some other memories include box lunches; standing watches; shooting rice bags; or watching your spotter (Wolfmanjack) shot down. Then there were attacks from shore positions, helicopters (Huey & Cobra Squadrons) showing up and killing the complete coast line adjacent to our gunline support station. I remember sweeping the shrapnel from the ship's surfaces and marking the ones stuck in the ships super structure. Guess you had to be there …almost every night for nine months to have those memories etched in your brain permanently. And I wonder how many times I stood Bridge Watch (Lookout or Helm) when the shit hit the fan, and the ship was overcome by enemy fire with splashes all round and in front of the ship. That was an interesting story of one night ,the "Battle of Brandon Bay.", but that was every night for me.

The Turner Joy (DD 951), came following the Goldsborough (DDG 20), which was hit 19 December 1972, in the area of AFT Damage Control, killing two sailors. The ship was dead in the water, until she pulled out to safety, during the same type of mission as the Battle Brandon Bay.

Oh, the Newport News (CA 148), on 1 October 1972, while in action off the Demilitarized Zone in Vietnam, Newport News sustained an in-bore explosion in her center 8-inch gun of number two turret. Twenty men were killed and thirty-six were injured. The Rear Admiral transferred his flag to the Cochrane as they were sitting next to Cochrane.

I was onboard during that raid. The Cochrane had her own stories to tell about that evening. I remember I was an OS2 at the time on duty in CIC. We were doing radar navigation. I was being fed ranges by Steve Wambaugh. With this I was plotting out position on a plotting table and it was being fed into the computer. At the table (to the best of my recolection) were the Capt Lt. Shirley and maybe one or two other people. It might of been Chief Ware or OS1 Mike Daniels.
All of a sudden, I heard what sounded like a bag of marbles hitting the deck above us. Everyone dropped to the floor. It was a lot of air bursts going off all around us.
On the signal bridge above us was at least one of Desron 25 staff officers. It was either Ltjg Lawson or Ltjg Jones. I guess it got pretty hot up there because when the airbursts started, He jumped into a life jacket locker on the side of the ecm shack. I wondered how much that would of helped as , by design, it was full of holes.
Being in CIC did have its advantages. While we were with drawing we were hearing of the success in direct fire at some shore batteries. That might of been GMM1 Dan Fugate. He was saying he could see a lot of secondaries. (the Cochrane got some too)
The next day we went up to the signal bridge, there was sharpnel all over some it as realitively big. One chuck about the size of my thumb was stuck into the side of a outside bulkhead.
I remember Capt. Kihune joking with me one time. He was wondering if 20 years from now one of us might be vacationing in Brandon Bay.
Wonder if that might come true yet.

I can remember that night as well. I was in CIC plotting surface contacts "shunks" and remember the shrapnel hitting the overhead. Then going out the next morning and seeing all the holes in the superstructure.